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1. See Convention for the Conservation of Antarctic Marine Living Resources
Homepage, http://www.ccamlr.org (last visited Mar. 18, 2008) [hereinafter CCAMLR
Website].
2. See generally Commission Introduction, CCAMLR Website,
http://www.ccamlr.org/pu/e/cc/intro.htm (last visited Mar. 18, 2008).
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Throughout the world, overexploitation threatens the future viability of
many fish stocks.  This threat extends to the most remote areas on earth,
including the Southern Ocean—that vast body of water surrounding the
Antarctic continent.  Indeed, the geographic isolation of the Antarctic is no
longer an insurmountable barrier to the large-scale exploitation of fish
stocks in that region.  The Southern Ocean, however, is not without
regulatory structure.  
The Convention for the Conservation of Antarctic Marine Living
Resources (CCAMLR, or The Convention, or Convention), a treaty that
aims to achieve sustainable exploitation of marine stocks in the Antarctic,
is the primary international instrument that applies to living resources in the
Southern Ocean.1  The institutional bodies formed under CCAMLR act as
a regional management regime that enacts conservation measures to ensure
the sustainable use of Antarctic marine species.2
This management regime, however, faces its own difficulties.  In
particular, CCAMLR’s effectiveness is threatened by continued illegal,
unreported and unregulated (IUU) fishing in the Southern Ocean region.
The problem is particularly prevalent in the Antarctic, because a large part
of the area constitutes high seas, thereby allowing states to fish freely under
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3. See Scientific Committee on Antarctic Research, http://www.scar.org/treaty/ (last
visited Mar. 18, 2008).
4. Convention for the Conservation of Antarctic Marine Living Resources, art. 1, sec.
1, May 20, 1980, 33 U.S.T. 3476 [hereinafter CCAMLR]. For a diagram of the CCAMLR
zone, see the Appendix.
international law.  Another factor contributing to the IUU problem is that
CCAMLR conservation measures on the high seas do not apply to countries
who are not parties to the treaty (non-party states).  This article will outline
the weaknesses in the CCAMLR regime and weaknesses in other inter-
national instruments in dealing with the IUU problem.  It will also discuss
applicable defenses that a state may raise in the event that it decides to take
direct action against IUU fishing vessels in the high seas of the Southern
Ocean, thereby exposing itself to potential liability under international law.
One such defense is to claim a “state of necessity” that makes it
imperative for a CCAMLR party state to take action in breach of
international law.  This paper will examine whether the dire threat to the
Antarctic ecosystem posed by IUU fishing could sustain such a defense.
Finally, this paper will consider the consequences of a defense of necessity
and whether this would be an effective means to combat IUU fishing.
II. THE CONVENTION FOR THE CONSERVATION OF ANTARCTIC MARINE
LIVING RESOURCES: A BRIEF OVERVIEW
As stated in the Introduction, Southern Ocean fisheries are regulated
predominantly by the international treaty, CCAMLR.  The fisheries are
further governed by a host of binding and non-binding international
conservation instruments, such as the United Nations Law of the Sea
Convention 1982 (UNCLOS), the Convention for Biological Diversity, and
the United Nations Food and Agriculture Organization Code of Conduct for
Responsible Fishing (UN FAO Code of Conduct).  While these other
sources of international law are general in nature and do not apply to the
Antarctic region exclusively,  CCAMLR does.
CCAMLR came into force in 1982 and the treaty is essentially part of
the Antarctic Treaty system.3  CCAMLR’s provisions only apply to a
specific region of the Antarctic—all areas south of sixty degrees latitude,
and those areas between that latitude and a phenomenon known as the
“Antarctic Convergence.”4  The “Antarctic Convergence” is an area of the
Southern Ocean where warmer waters moving from more northerly
latitudes mix with the colder waters of the Antarctic.  The point of
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5. Australian Antarctic Division—Antarctic Convergence, http://www.aad.gov.au/
default.asp?casid=6558 (last visited Mar. 18, 2008).
6. CCAMLR, supra note 4, art. 1, sec. 1.
7. Id. art. 2, sec. 2.  The term “rational use” is not itself defined in the Convention.
8. See Commission Introduction, CCAMLR Website, http://www.ccamlr.org/pu/e/
cc/intro.htm (last visited Mar. 18, 2008).
9. CCAMLR, supra note 4, art. 9, sec. 1(f).
10. Understanding CCAMLR’s Approach to Management, http://www.ccamlr.org/pu/E/
e_pubs/am/p6.htm#3.4Application (last visited Mar. 18, 2008).
11. See id.
12. See CCAMLR Website, http://www.ccamlr.org/pu/e/e_pubs/cm/drt.htm (last visited
Mar. 18, 2008).
13. Such limits are conservative catch limits that take into account the scientific
uncertainty surrounding particular species including population levels, recruitment rates, and
interactions with other species.
convergence has a higher level of nutrients and a correspondingly higher
concentration of marine plant and animal life.5
Article II(1) of CCAMLR states that the treaty’s objective is the
conservation of Antarctic marine living resources.6  However, “conserva-
tion” is defined to include “rational use.”7  Accordingly, CCAMLR
addresses both species protection and their “rational use.”  CCAMLR
therefore includes potentially conflicting goals of exploitation and conser-
vation of marine species in Antarctica.  In this respect, through its institu-
tional bodies (i.e. the CCAMLR Commission, and the Secretariat and
Scientific Committee), CCAMLR acts as a regional fisheries organization
that manages living resources in the Southern Ocean area.  
The Convention gives the CCAMLR Commission (the Commission8)
the power to formulate, adopt and revise conservation measures pertaining
to particular species.9  In this respect, the Commission maintains an
“ecosystem approach” to fisheries management.  This approach envisions
managing marine living resources by examining the effect of maintaining
particular population and harvesting levels on the entire ecosystem.  The
ecosystem approach also uses “feedback management.”  Using this
technique, scientists set a species-specific target population and monitor
changes from that target.10  If the actual population level begins to deviate
from this target, various management control techniques of the system can
be altered to maintain the target population.11
As part of its approach to fisheries management, CCAMLR has
released a number of conservation measures aimed at the conservation and
rational use of both certain species and fisheries practices in general.12
These conservation measures include “precautionary” fisheries catch limits
for particular species.13  The effectiveness of these precautionary catch
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14. Arguably, Antarctic claimant states may be able to enforce CCAMLR measures
within maritime zones they have claimed, even though all Antarctic claims were frozen
under the Antarctic Treaty.  This question will not be considered in this paper, but it should
be noted that this also involves an issue as to the relationship between the land-based
Antarctic claims and other maritime claims.
15. CCAMLR, supra note 4, art. 10.
16. “Illegal” fishing involves fishing by vessels within a state’s jurisdiction in
contravention of its laws, or fishing by flag vessels in contravention of the conservation
measures of regional management organizations of which the flag state is a member.  See
International Plan of Action to Prevent, Deter, and Eliminate Illegal, Unreported and
Unregulated Fishing, 2001, art. 3.1 [hereinafter IPOA-IUU].  “Unreported” fishing refers
to the misreporting, or the failure to report, fishing activities occurring within the zone of
control of a particular regional management organization.  Id. art. 3.2.  “Unregulated” fishing
refers to harvesting activities carried out by vessels from flag states that are not members of
the relevant regional management organization.  Id. art. 3.3.
limits is hampered, however, by several problems, which will now be
discussed.
III. THE IUU FISHING PROBLEM
A.  An Overview of the Problem
There are currently thirty-four states party to (party states), nine
acceding states to, and several observers to CCAMLR.  The relatively small
number of party states creates several problems for the management
regime.  In particular, the regulatory scope of CCAMLR’s conservation
measures would be quite limited if these measures were only enforceable
against party states.  The question remains as to whether these measures
can be enforced against the flag vessels of non-party states on the high seas.
Currently, CCAMLR does not impose any legal obligations against non-
party states.14  Instead, CCAMLR enforcement power over non-party states
is limited to alerting the offending state that its activities are negatively
affecting CCAMLR’s goals.15  Such efforts are frustratingly ineffective and
arguably futile.  
Without legal effect on non-party states, CCAMLR is powerless to stop
the flag vessels of third party states from acting in contravention of
CCAMLR’s conservation measures.  The most prevalent of such con-
travening action is IUU fishing.16  CCAMLR and other regional fisheries
management organizations have been plagued by this problem.  By
definition, IUU fishing can occur both within a state’s jurisdiction and in
a zone under the control of a regional fisheries management organization.
The Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (U.N. FAO)
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17. UN FAO Website, http://www.fao.org (last visited Mar. 18, 2008).
18. High Seas Task Force, Closing the Net: Stopping illegal fishing on the high seas
(2006), available at http://www.high-seas.org/docs/HSTFfinal/HSTF-Final-Report-09-03-
06.pdf. 
19. United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, Dec. 10, 1982, 1833 U.N.T.S.
397, art. 73 [hereinafter UNCLOS].
20. Id. art. 56.
21. Id. art. 62.
22. CCAMLR, CCAMLR REPORT OF MEMBER’S ACTIVITIES IN THE CONVENTION AREA
2001-02—AUSTRALIA (2002), available at http://www.ccamlr.org/pu/E/e_pubs/ma/01-02/
Australia_ 02.pdf. In early 2002, an Australian navy patrol boat detained two Russian
vessels, the Lena and the Volga, that were engaged in illegal harvesting of Toothfish within
these EEZs.
has produced estimates suggesting that in some fisheries the proportion of
total catches coming from IUU fishing is as much as thirty percent.17  The
High Seas Task Force also released a report on the problem of high seas
illegal fishing in 2006, which highlighted the massive value of the illegal
fishing industry.18
B.  The Legal Issue of IUU Fishing and CCAMLR
According to UNCLOS, a state can seize an IUU vessel within its
Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ).19  This right arises as a consequence of
coastal states’ sovereign rights over the exploitation of natural resources
within their EEZ.20  Several states, such as the United Kingdom, France,
and Australia have sovereign territories within the Southern Ocean that
generate EEZs under UNCLOS.  Under Article 62 of UNCLOS, nationals
of states fishing within another EEZ are required to comply with
conservation and other measures of the coastal state.21  Australia, for
example, has detained fishing boats with illegally obtained Patagonian
Toothfish in its declared EEZ around Heard and MacDonald Islands.22  The
greater capacity, and perhaps a greater willingness, of coastal states to
exercise control over foreign vessels operating in their EEZs may make it
easier to achieve a reduction in IUU fishing in these zones.  There are,
however, still enforcement problems due to the geographical barriers of
operating in the Antarctic region.
As previously discussed, one of the major problems with CCAMLR is
that flag vessels of non-parties are not legally bound by the Convention’s
provisions.  They are not bound to fish in compliance with the conservation
measures introduced under the Convention, including the precautionary
catch limits set by the Commission.  This has the potential to undermine
CCAMLR’s efforts to conserve and promote the rational use of marine
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23. UNCLOS, supra note 19, art. 87.
24. Id. art. 116.
25. Id. art. 116-19.
26. See id. part XII.
27. Id. art. 192.
28. Id. art. 197.
29. Id. art. 235.
30. See Southern Bluefin Tuna Cases (N.Z. v. Japan; Austl. v. Japan), 117 I.L.R. 148
(Int’l Trib. L. of the Sea 1999).  Australia did argue in the Southern Bluefin Tuna Cases that
Japan had breached its conservation and cooperation obligations under UNCLOS.  As the
case was not decided by ITLOS on its merits, one can only speculate as to how the Tribunal
would have interpreted the conservation provisions of UNCLOS.
living resources in the Southern Ocean.  The danger posed to CCAMLR’s
efforts is further compounded by the uncertainty that exists as to the level
of IUU catch.
That a large part of the geographic area covered by CCAMLR (the
CCAMLR Zone, or the Convention Zone) constitutes high seas areas
outside of any EEZ further enhances the problem of third party compliance.
This is largely due to the customary legal principle of the freedom of the
high seas, which applies under UNCLOS.23  This freedom functionally
provides flag vessels of non-parties to CCAMLR the right to fish in high
seas areas of the Convention Zone in breach of the Commission’s
conservation measures.  UNCLOS explicitly grants states the right of its
nationals to engage in fishing on the high seas.24  However, this right is
purportedly tempered by the states’ duty to take measures necessary for the
conservation of living resources of the high seas.  Such measures may
include cooperation with other states, or even the establishment of regional
fisheries organizations.25
Part XII of UNCLOS outlines the states’ further obligations in respect
to the protection and preservation of the marine environment.26  These
obligations include a general obligation to protect and preserve the marine
environment27 by cooperating to formulate standards and practices for that
purpose while taking into account regional characteristics.28  States are also
responsible for fulfilling such obligations under Article 235 and will be
held liable under international law if they fail to do so.29
The effectiveness of these conservation provisions is endangered by the
breadth of the provisions.  The UNCLOS provisions do not place any
specific obligation on third party states to abide by CCAMLR’s
conservation measures or to ratify CCAMLR.30  A second international
agreement, the United Nations Agreement on Straddling Fish Stocks and
Highly Migratory Species 1995 (Fish Stocks Agreement), was introduced
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31. The United Nations Agreement on Straddling Fish Stocks and Highly Migratory
Species, art. 3(1), Sept. 8, 1995, 34 I.L.M 1542 [hereinafter Fish Stocks Agreement].
32. Id. art. 2.
33. Although it should be noted that Annex 1 of UNCLOS, itself, contains a list of highly
migratory species, which may apply in respect of the Fish Stocks Agreement.
34. Fish Stocks Agreement, supra note 31, art. 2.
35. Id. art. 5.
36. Id. art. 5(e).
37. See David J. Doulman, The Code of Conduct for Responsible Fisheries: The
Requirement for Structural Change and Adjustment in the Fisheries Sector, part I (1998),
available at http://www.fao.org/DOCREP/006/AD364E/AD364E00.htm.
38. Agreement to Promote Compliance with International Conservation and Management
Measures by Fishing Vessels on the High Seas, art. 2, available at
http://www.ftp.fao.org/docrep/fao/Meeting/006/x3130m00.pdf [hereinafter Compliance
Agreement].
as a supplement to UNCLOS. 31  It applies to high seas areas beyond
national jurisdiction, and was enacted to remedy the deficiencies of that
agreement in respect to straddling fish stocks and highly migratory
species.32
“Highly migratory” species are not defined in the Fish Stocks
Agreement.33  The main objective of the Fish Stocks Agreement is the long-
term conservation and sustainable use of these species through effective
implementation of UNCLOS.34  Other objectives include optimum utiliza-
tion of stocks and maintenance of stock levels that produce a maximum sus-
tainable yield.35  The Fish Stocks Agreement contains numerous generaliz-
ed provisions, such as the Article 5(e) requirement directing states to
“adopt, where necessary, conservation and management measures for
species belonging to the same ecosystem or associated with or dependent
upon the target stocks, with a view to maintaining or restoring populations
of such species above levels at which their reproduction may become
seriously threatened.”36  Despite its application in the high seas, this
provision is limited both in scope (to particular species) and in its
effectiveness by overly broad language.  Furthermore, the provisions do not
provide an effective means of combating the problem of third party
enforcement in the CCAMLR zone.
Several other international instruments have also attempted to stem the
problem of IUU fishing.  The Agreement to Promote Compliance with
International Conservation and Management Measures by Fishing Vessels
on the High Seas (Compliance Agreement) was adopted in November 1993
by the Twenty-Seventh Session of the FAO Conference.37  The Compliance
Agreement is legally binding and has a broad scope because it applies to all
fishing vessels on the high seas.38  The Compliance Agreement also intends
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39. Id. art. 8.  Parties are required to both encourage non-parties to act consistently with
the Compliance Agreement, and to cooperate consistently with international law so that flag
vessels of non-parties do not undermine the Agreement.  Id.
40. Rebecca Bratspies, Finessing King Neptune: Fisheries Management and the Limits
of International Law, 25 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 213, 233-34 (2001).  The Code, in Article
1.1, specifically acknowledges that FAO Conference resolution 15/93 states that the
Compliance Agreement forms an “integral” part of the Code.  U.N. FAO, Code of Conduct
for Responsible Fisheries art. 1.1, available at ftp://ftp.fao.org/docrep/fao/005/v9878e/
v9878e00.pdf [hereinafter FAO Code of Conduct].
41. U.N. FAO, COMMITTEE ON FISHERIES, REPORT ON THE TWENTY-FOURTH SESSION OF
THE COMMITTEE ON FISHERIES, 14-17, FIPL/R655 (2001).
42. U.N. FAO, Technical Consultation to Review Progress and Promote the Full
Implementation of the IPOA to Prevent, Deter and Eliminate IUU Fishing and the IPOA for
the Management of Fishing Capacity, ¶ 68 (2004), available at ftp://ftp.fao.org/fi/
DOCUMENT/tc-iuu-cap/2004/inf3e.pdf [hereinafter Technical Consultation]. 
43. Bratspies, supra note 40, at 235.  Article III(1)(a) of the Compliance Agreement also
requires states to take such measures “as may be necessary” to ensure that their flag vessels
do not undermine the effectiveness of international conservation and management measures.
Id.
44. Ian J. Popick, Are There Really Plenty of Fish in the Sea? The World Trade
Organization’s Presence is Effectively Frustrating the International Community’s Attempts
to Conserve the Chilean Sea Bass, 50 EMORY L.J. 939, 964 (2001) (arguing that the “tragedy
of the commons” in the Southern Ocean has led to the failure of informal environmental
protection because flag states, realizing their restrictions on fishing put them at an economic
disadvantage, lighten the burden of their regulations, thus minimizing their protective effect).
to encourage compliance of non-parties.39  These generalized provisions
require encouragement and cooperation, but do little to strengthen the legal
regime against non-party fishing in the CCAMLR Zone.
Other international agreements have a similar intent.  The FAO Code
of Conduct for Responsible Fisheries, for example, mirrors large parts of
the Compliance Agreement.40  Other provisions of the Compliance
Agreement were also included within the International Plan of Action to
Prevent, Deter and Eliminate IUU fishing (IPOA-IUU).41
Both the Code and IPOA are limited because they include only
voluntary provisions that do not require states to implement effective IUU
controls.  A recent survey by the FAO reveals the ineffectiveness of these
voluntary provisions; only twenty-four percent of reporting FAO member
states indicated that they were currently formulating a national plan of
action to put the IPOA into place.42  Thus, while the Code makes flag states
responsible for enforcement, it provides few methods to actually enforce
non-party compliance.43
Furthermore, states that actively enforce strict flag control measures put
themselves at a disadvantage over those states that do not.44  As a result,
some states may publicly endorse enforcement of strict flag control
2008] A State of Necessity 241
45. Technical Consultation, supra note 42, ¶ 39.
46. Id. ¶ 74.
47. Christopher J. Carr & Harry N. Scheiber, Dealing with a Resource Crisis: Regulatory
Regimes for Managing the World’s Marine Fisheries, 21 STAN. ENVTL. L.J. 45, 60 (2002).
48. Deirdre M. Warner-Kramer & Krista Canty, Stateless Fishing Vessels: The Current
International Regime and a New Approach, 5 OCEAN & COASTAL L.J. 227, 232 (2000).
49. Carr & Sheiber, supra note 47, at 61.
50. Rachel Baird, Fishing the Southern Ocean: The Development of Fisheries and the
Role of CCAMLR in their Management, 16(2) U. TASMANIA L. REV. 160, 169 (1997).
51. U.N. FAO, Fisheries and Aquaculture Department, The Rome Declaration on the
Implementation of the Code of Conduct for Responsible Fisheries, art. 12(J) (Mar. 10-11,
1999), available at http://www.fao.org/docrep/005/x2220e/x2220e00.htm (endorsing a
global action plan to deal with IUU and the “flags of convenience” problem) [hereinafter
Rome Declaration].
measures but do not enforce such measures in practice.  A recent survey by
the FAO did, however, report that fifty-nine percent of reporting member
states had taken appropriate action to ensure that their flag vessels do not
undermine high seas conservation and management measures.45  It is
difficult to effectively enforce controls over flag vessels because vessel
owners are motivated by private interests.46  Competition from vessels
under weaker controls can force some flag state vessels to engage in IUU
fishing so that they remain economically viable.  Hence, even with stricter
controls, there is still a risk that vessels will make greater use of “flags of
convenience.” 
C.  Flags of Convenience
The introduction of strong control measures by flag states to regulate
their vessels could actually lead to an increase in IUU fishing.  Strong
enforcement measures taken by states against their nationals often results
in the “reflagging” of vessels with “flags of convenience.”47  Fishing
vessels often change their flag registration to states with little regulation or
to states that are not parties to regional fisheries organizations.48  This
allows them to avoid stricter regulatory controls and monitoring.  For
example, a large number of tuna vessels changed their registration from the
United States to other countries to avoid strict dolphin protection
legislation.49  The “flags of convenience” problem extends to member states
of CCAMLR whose national’s fishing vessels also occasionally fly under
the flags of non-member states to circumvent restrictive regulations.50
Some international instruments made attempts to deter reflagging.51
For example, one method of deterrence is the adoption of uniform
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52. Under IPOA-IUU, flag states are required to adopt uniform standards so that there
are no incentives to reflag.  The IPOA also generally requires states to deter their flag vessels
from reflagging to avoid compliance with conservation and management measures.  See
IPOA-IUU, supra note 16, art. 38.  
53. Id. ¶ 39.
54. Id.
55. See Doulman, supra note 37.
56. Id. part IV, n.27.
57. Id.
58. Technical Consultation, supra note 42, ¶¶ 74, 76.
standards.52  If states uniformly adopt the same level of strict control over
flag vessels, then there is little reason to reflag.  Practically, however, it
will be difficult for all states to impose uniform standards.  It would be
particularly difficult for developing states that may not have the necessary
resources to introduce and monitor significant new regulatory requirements.
To aid developing countries in this respect, the United Nations General
Assembly has established an Assistance Fund.  States are also required to
take all “practicable” steps to prevent “flag hopping” of vessels.53  Such
steps could include denying a vessel the right to reflag and an authorization
to fish. 54
Unfortunately, attempts made by international agreements, such as the
IPOA and the Compliance Agreement, seem to have had little real impact
on the use of flags of convenience.  The FAO has looked at reflagging in
the wake of the Compliance Agreement to gauge its impact on the
practice.55  Only a small proportion of all reflaggings (around fifteen
percent) were motivated by a desire to use a flag of convenience.56
However, even after implementation of the Compliance Agreement, around
five percent of the world’s fleet appears to still use flags of convenience.57
Compounding the problem are funding shortfalls; a recent survey by the
FAO reported that over half of the reporting member states had inadequate
financial resources to develop a national plan of action to combat IUU
fishing and enforce fisheries management measures.58  Accordingly, it
seems that international agreements have been ineffective in dealing with
the “flags of convenience” problem.  This remains a burden for regional
management regimes like CCAMLR.  “Flags of convenience” vessels
continue to engage in IUU fishing in the CCAMLR zone.  As a result, the
effectiveness of CCAMLR’s conservation measures is threatened in high
seas areas of the CCAMLR zone because that treaty does not apply to non-
parties to the Convention. 
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59. UNCLOS, supra note 19, art. 92(1).
60. Id. art. 92(2).
61. Id.
62. Warner-Kramer & Canty, supra note 48, at 227.
63. IPOA-IUU, supra note 16, art. 20.
64. H. Edwin Anderson, The Nationality of Ships and Flags of Convenience: Economics,
Politics, and Alternatives, 21 TUL. MAR. L.J. 139, 141 (1996).  See also Molvan v. A.G. for
Palestine, 81 L.I.L. Rep. 277 (1948) (holding that stateless vessels are not protected by any
state, and suggesting that any state can assert jurisdiction over these vessels); United States
v. Victoria, 876 F.2d 1009 (1st Cir. 1989) (holding that the United States had jurisdiction
over a vessel captured on the high seas because it was stateless).  Such cases may make it
easier to limit IUU fishing.  
65. See United States v. Marino-Garcia, 679 F.2d 1373, 1386-87 (11th Cir. 1982).
66. Commission for the Conservation of Antarctic Marine Living Resources, CCAMLR
Conservation Measure 10-06 (2004), available at http://www.ccamlr.org/pu/e/e_pubs/cm/
04-05/10-06.pdf.
D.  Stateless Vessels
UNCLOS prohibits state flag vessels from changing flags during a
voyage59 and prevents vessels sailing under two or more flags as a means
of convenience.60  Such vessels can be classified as stateless ships.61  Under
pressure from the international community, some states are even deregister-
ing many vessels found using flags of convenience.62  The IPOA requires
states to take measures consistent with international law in relation to
stateless vessels engaged in IUU fishing on the high seas.63  Because
stateless vessels do not come under national or international law, any state
can exercise jurisdiction over them.64  Because of this, freedom of the high
seas and non-membership of regional management organizations will not
provide barriers to enforcement against such vessels.  This would give other
states greater power to reduce IUU fishing conducted by stateless vessels
previously flying under flags of convenience.  Action taken against
stateless vessels on the high seas, though perhaps not in accordance with
customary international law, is not without precedent.  For example, the
United States took action against stateless vessels on the high seas to
combat narcotics trafficking.65
E.  IUU Vessel List
The CCAMLR Commission established an “IUU Vessel List,” which
reports any vessels of CCAMLR party states that have engaged in IUU
fishing.66  Party states who acquire information concerning the IUU fishing
activities of flag vessels of other party states are required to submit a report
to the Commission outlining evidence of that activity.  Those vessels on the
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67. Id.
68. U.N. General Assembly, Report on the work of the United Nations Open-ended
Informal Consultative Process on Oceans and the Law of the Sea at its sixth meeting, ¶ 6,
U.N. Doc. A/60/99, July 7, 2005, available at http://documents-dds-ny.un.org/doc/
UNDOC/GEN/N05/ 414/01/pdf/N0541401.pdf?OpenElement [hereinafter Consultative
Process Report].
69. IPOA-IUU, supra note 16, art. 55.
70. Commission for the Conservation of Antarctic Marine Living Resources, CCAMLR
Conservation Measure 10-07 (2003), available at http://www.ccamlr.org/pu/e/e_pubs/
cm/03-04/10-07.pdf.
list face considerable restrictions and prohibitions.67  These may include
prohibition from member state ports, revocation of licenses to fish in the
Convention Zone, and in extreme cases, deregistration of vessels.  The IUU
Vessel List is not the only effort to publish and control offending ships.  In
a recent 2005 United Nations report, it was proposed that the General
Assembly urge states to establish lists of vessels that had engaged in IUU
fishing.68  Like the CCAMLR Commission’s IUU Vessel List, such lists
would enable identification of problem vessels so that states can ban these
vessels from their ports.   
F.  Port State Measures
The IPOA, Compliance Agreement, and Fish Stocks Agreement all
contain measures to prevent IUU fishing that are specific to port states.  For
example, vessels must have permission to enter ports and must further
provide documentation relating to their license, catch quantities, and
fishing trip.69  These measures work together as a control mechanism on
fishing vessels trying to unload IUU catches.  The control mechanism, of
course, is not perfect; the details of catch quantities and fishing trips are
open to fraud.
The CCAMLR Commission has also recently introduced measures
applying to non-member states in an attempt to garner their compliance
with CCAMLR conservation requirements.  At each of its annual meetings,
the Commission will identify non-member states whose vessels have been
engaged in IUU activities in contravention of the treaty’s conservation
requirements.70  In addition, the Commission now makes a presumption that
all non-party state vessels fishing in the CCAMLR Zone are undermining
the effectiveness of CCAMLR conservation measures.  Accordingly, any
such vessel entering a port of a member state is not permitted to offload its
catch unless the vessel establishes that the fish were caught in compliance
with all CCAMLR conservation requirements.
2008] A State of Necessity 245
71. Consultative Process Report, supra note 68, at 15, ¶ 44.
72. Id.
73. Final Report of the Twenty-ninth Antarctic Treaty Consultative Meeting, in
ANTARCTICA: LEGAL AND ENVIRONMENTAL CHALLENGES FOR THE FUTURE (Gillian Triggs
& Anna Riddell, eds., 2007).
74. UNCLOS, supra note 19, art. 87.
75. Id. art. 116-19 and Part XII.
IV. ACTION AGAINST THIRD PARTY STATES
A.  Implications of Such Action
In light of the continued ineffectiveness of efforts to combat IUU
fishing, delegations to the 2005 United Nations Consultative Process
suggested other solutions.71  Some states expressed support for a network
of high seas protected areas as proposed by the Johannesburg Plan of
Implementation and drafted at the World Summit for Sustainable
Development in 2002.  Other states expressed concern that this approach
could restrict a state’s high seas freedoms unless the state’s consent was
required.72  This disagreement among the states further illustrates the
difficulties of controlling fishing activities in high seas areas, such as the
Southern Ocean.
The inability of states to effectively control fishing activities on the
high seas raises the issue of whether CCAMLR members can fight the
problem by taking any form of action against non-member flagged IUU
fishing vessels within the CCAMLR zone.  To explore this issue, the
CCAMLR Commission has considered commissioning a legal review of
high seas enforcement capacity.  This review would seek to determine if
actions sanctioned by  UNCLOS could be taken against non-party flag
vessels fishing in the CCAMLR Zone.73
If such actions were permitted, CCAMLR party states could take more
aggressive steps against IUU vessels, including boarding the vessel, seizing
any catch harvested in the CCAMLR Zone, and impounding the vessel to
prevent future IUU fishing activities.
Such actions, however, may conflict with state’s freedom to fish in the
high seas under Article 87 of UNCLOS.74  This freedom is not without
limitation.  UNCLOS itself contains conservation requirements which limit
freedom to fish the high seas.  These conservation requirements include: a
duty to cooperate, directly or through regional management organizations,
with other states to conserve high seas living resources; and a duty to
formulate practices and standards for that purpose.75  States are also
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responsible for fulfilling such obligations under Article 235 and will be
held liable under international law if they fail to do so.76
To reconcile this conflict, CCAMLR states could argue that their
unilateral action against non-member IUU vessels is permissible because
the UNCLOS conservation requirements supercede the UNCLOS freedom
to fish the high seas.  Furthermore, the non-member states themselves, in
failing to control their nationals within the CCAMLR zone, may be in
violation of UNCLOS for failure to cooperate with a regional management
organization (CCAMLR) to conserve high seas living resources.  Similar
arguments may also be possible under the Fish Stocks Agreement and
Compliance Agreements which also apply to high seas areas.  
The merits of this line of argument will not be considered in detail in
this article.  It will be assumed for the purposes of this article that measures
taken by CCAMLR members on the high seas against non-party flag
vessels could potentially breach the high seas fisheries rights of those non-
party states under UNCLOS.  Even with this assumption, the question
remains as to whether those parties to CCAMLR in breach would be held
responsible under international law.
B.  Vienna Convention and Non-parties to Treaties
The Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties 1969 (the Vienna
Convention) establishes in Article 34 that a treaty does not create either
obligations or rights for a third-party state without that state’s consent.77
Consequently, CCAMLR, as a treaty, does not obligate third-party states
to observe its conservation provisions within the CCAMLR zone.  Article
34 of the Vienna Convention is not conclusive on the issue.  Article 73 of
the Vienna Convention provides that its provisions “shall not prejudge any
question that may arise . . . from the international responsibility of a
state.”78  Accordingly, Article 34 of the Vienna Convention, relating to the
application of treaty obligations to third-party states, is not determinative
as to whether a CCAMLR member state would be internationally
responsible for taking measures on the high seas against non-member states
in furtherance of CCAMLR conservation measures.
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C.  An Internationally Wrongful Act
The International Law Commission’s Articles on the Responsibility of
States for Internationally Wrongful Acts provides that an internationally
wrongful act occurs when conduct is attributable to a state under
international law and constitutes a breach of an international obligation of
the state.79  Under Article 12, there is a breach of an international obligation
by a state when an act of that state is not in conformity with what is
required of it by that obligation.80
A CCAMLR member taking action against non-party IUU fishing
vessels in the CCAMLR zone may violate the UNCLOS high seas fishing
freedom if the conservation provisions of UNCLOS do not apply.  The
CCAMLR member could therefore have breached an international
obligation.  If the state’s official flag vessels participate in the breach, that
act will be attributable to the CCAMLR member.  Accordingly, the
CCAMLR member may have committed an internationally wrongful act.
The issue is, therefore, whether responsibility for such an unlawful act
can be absolved, justified or excused based on some defense in inter-
national law.  There are a number of potential defenses available against an
internationally wrongful act.  This paper will focus specifically on the
defense of “necessity” and whether such a defense could be successfully
used by CCAMLR members with respect to actions taken against non-party
fishing vessels on the high seas.
D.  Duties Under the UN Charter
A key consideration is whether the defense of necessity can be used
where the internationally wrongful act involves a use of force.  In the case
under consideration, forceful action may be required when non-party states’
IUU flag vessels do not voluntarily surrender their IUU fishing catch when
requested by the party state.  The United Nations Charter contains specific
prohibitions against the use of force.81  Force can include, it has been
argued, economic actions or physical actions other than military actions. 82
Accordingly, it might be argued that trade restrictive actions taken against
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IUU fishing in the CCAMLR zone constitute a “use of force” prohibited by
the UN Charter.83    The particular prohibition on the use of force in the UN
charter applies as follows: “All Members shall refrain in their international
relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or
political independence of any state, or in any other manner inconsistent
with the Purposes of the United Nations.”84
The prohibition on the use of force in the circumstances set out in the
United Nations Charter is a jus cogens—its principles cannot be derogated
from by any state or organization with international legal personality (save
in the limited circumstances enunciated in the Charter).85  The conse-
quences of the defense of necessity may be that the defense cannot be relied
upon where force is involved.  The ILC’s Articles on the Responsibility of
States for Internationally Wrongful Acts codifies many aspects of state
responsibility, including the doctrine of necessity.86  These articles do not
make it clear whether the doctrine of necessity can be used to avoid the
prohibition on the use of force in Article 2(4) of the U.N. Charter.87  The
ILC, in the commentaries to its original Draft Articles, contemplated
whether or not necessity applied to breaches of Article 2(4).  The ILC
questioned whether the Charter implicitly excluded necessity because
Article 51 of the Charter only explicitly mentions self-defense as a
legitimate use of armed force.88  The ILC did not, however, answer this
question and so it remains an unresolved issue.
Before examining whether actions by CCAMLR against non-party
fishing vessels would breach Article 2(4), it is important to examine the
potential defenses to a breach of Article 2(4) that are present in the U.N.
Charter itself.  The main defense is the inherent right to self-defense that
has been codified in Article 51 of the U.N. Charter.  Specifically, Article
51 provides that:
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Nothing in the present Charter shall impair the inherent right of
individual or collective self-defense if an armed attack occurs
against a Member of the United Nations, until the Security Council
has taken measures necessary to maintain international peace and
security.  Measures taken by Members in the exercise of this right
of self-defense shall be immediately reported to the Security
Council and shall not in any way affect the authority and responsi-
bility of the Security Council under the present Charter to take at
any time such action as it deems necessary in order to maintain or
restore international peace and security.89
Thus, for an act of force to be justified as self-defense the act must
have been taken in  response to an “armed attack.”  However, as “armed
attack” is not defined in the U.N. Charter, it is subject to interpretation.
One view of an “armed attack” is that it must come from a state, meaning
that the standard for self-defense will not be met if only private entities are
involved.90  For example, under this interpretation, a CCAMLR party
state’s flag vessel could not claim self-defense against a non-party IUU
fishing vessel that acted aggressively towards it, where the fishing vessel
is privately owned.  
An alternative view is that an armed attack can indeed originate from
a private entity.91  However, low-level violence is unlikely to be sufficient
to constitute an “armed attack.”  Therefore, low-level violence by an IUU
fishing vessel is unlikely to support a claim of self-defense under the U.N.
Charter.  
In any event, this article examines whether CCAMLR parties would be
justified in taking action against non-party IUU vessels and whether it is
likely that CCAMLR parties would need to be the instigators of force in
order to, for example, seize IUU catch held on such a vessel.  Accordingly,
self-defense is unlikely to be available as a defense to breaches of the
prohibition on the use of force under these particular circumstances.
Moreover, it is unclear whether the doctrine of necessity, distinct from a
claim of self-defense, could be used to justify force against IUU fishing
vessels.
If the doctrine of necessity were not available as an independent claim
from that of self defense, there is a question as to whether acts taken by
CCAMLR members against IUU fishing vessels in the CCAMLR zone
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would actually breach Article 2(4) of the U.N Charter.  Article 2(4) pro-
hibits states from using or threatening to use force “in their international
relations . . . against the territorial integrity or political independence of any
state, or in any other manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the United
Nations.”92
 If a state argues that one of these conditions is not met, then the
prohibition on the use of force may be avoided.93  In regard to IUU fishing
in the CCAMLR Zone, arguably any action taken against IUU vessels
would not be “in international relations” because it would be taken against
a private vessel, not against a state.  Of course, the counter argument would
be that because the vessels are flagged to a particular state, any action taken
against them on the high seas is a matter “in international relations”
because it could be considered a potential breach of the high seas fishing
freedoms of the flag state.
A more compelling argument is that action taken against IUU fishers
in the CCAMLR zone would not be action against “the territorial integrity
or political independence of any state.”94  One commentator contends that,
based on the ILC’s commentaries to its Articles on State Responsibility,
acts that fall short of the use of force to threaten territorial integrity do not
breach Article 2(4) of the U.N. Charter because threats to territorial
integrity may involve a breach of a peremptory norm.95  However, lesser
degrees of force may not be regarded as a breach of a peremptory norm.  A
peremptory norm or jus cogens is a rule of international law that states
cannot derogate, and thus the doctrine of necessity, when examined
separately from self-defense, cannot apply to justify breach of jus cogens.
The high seas do not constitute part of the territory of any state;
therefore, a “territorial integrity” argument does not apply to actions taken
by CCAMLR parties on the high seas.  States do have certain rights on the
high seas, but those rights do not have any bearing on the territorial rights
or integrity of any state.  Thus, actions taken on the high seas in the
CCAMLR zone would not be actions against the territorial integrity of the
flag state of an IUU fishing vessel.  Similarly, an action taken against a
private IUU fishing vessel on the high seas could not be said to infringe on
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the political independence of any state.  With respect to stateless vessels,96
the argument would seem to be a fait accompli, because the use of force
against such vessels would not be action taken against any state.
Similar to action taken on the high seas, action taken against an IUU
fishing vessel in one of the maritime areas adjacent to the Antarctic
continent may not be a threat to the territorial integrity of that vessel’s flag
state.  Article IV of the Antarctic Treaty froze all claims to sovereignty over
the territory of Antarctica.97  The uncertainty surrounding the land claims
makes it equally uncertain as to whether coastal states, which can claim
territorial seas, exist in Antarctica.98  Further, there are issues regarding
whether or not maritime claims are covered by Article IV of the Antarctic
Treaty (and thus are frozen by that treaty);  whether EEZs can even exist
in the Antarctic, because the concept of EEZs did not exist in international
law prior to the treaty; and whether formal recognition of coastal state
sovereignty is required before sovereignty can be physically claimed over
a maritime area.99  These issues may affect whether a CCAMLR party state
breaches Article 2(4) of the U.N Charter when it takes action against non-
parties in potential maritime claim areas adjacent to the mainland of
Antarctica.  
One potential argument is that the use of force by CCAMLR party
states against non-party fishing vessels in these areas could constitute a use
of force against territorial integrity, the reason being that the use of force
within a maritime area would ordinarily be within the jurisdiction of the
state alone (i.e. the state with sovereignty or sovereign rights over maritime
areas).  Even if maritime claims were frozen under the Antarctic Treaty,
using force in those claimed areas could be a challenge to the claimant
state’s potential sovereignty and, accordingly, a threat to its potential
territorial integrity.
The final question as to whether action by CCAMLR would breach
Article 2(4) is whether a use of force in such circumstances would be
“inconsistent with the Purposes of the United Nations.”100  The Preamble
to the U.N. Charter states that its objectives include “to maintain
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international peace and security” and to “ensure . . . that armed force shall
not be used, save in the common interest.”101  Furthermore, one of the
purposes of the United Nations, as enumerated in Article 1 of the U.N.
Charter, is “to maintain international peace and security.”102   It is question-
able whether actions taken by CCAMLR party states against non-party IUU
vessels in the CCAMLR zone would be inconsistent with these purposes.
On the one hand, such actions are ostensibly taken against private
individuals, not states.  Therefore, it could be argued that these actions,
because they are not being taken against states, are not inconsistent with the
maintenance of international peace and security.  On the other hand, actions
against a vessel of a particular flag state may cause conflict with that state,
and could be interpreted as inconsistent with the maintenance of
international peace.  However, action against a vessel of a particular flag
state may be justified if the use of force was “in the common interest.”  
Arguably, the effective maintenance of a management regime like
CCAMLR in the Southern Ocean is indeed in the common interest of the
international community as a whole.  Because it contravenes CCAMLR’s
conservation measures, IUU fishing is likely to lead to the degradation of
fish stocks in the region.  Harm to the Antarctic ecosystem is not in the
common interest because it adversely affects the sustainable exploitation
of marine living resources in the region by all states and it affects the
common interest in preserving the Antarctic environment.  Therefore,
action taken to protect the CCALMR regime in the Southern Ocean may be
justified as being force taken in the common interest. 
If CCAMLR action breaches the provisions of U.N. Charter Article
2(4), then whether necessity could be used as a defense is relevant.103  At
least one commentator believes that the ILC in drafting its Articles on State
Responsibility, which include a clause specifically dealing with the defense
of necessity, did not take a position on whether necessity can be used to
defend forcible actions that constitute something less than outright
aggression.104  Thus, it is still unclear whether the defense of necessity
justifies a use of force under the U.N. Charter, where CCAMLR party
states take action against private vessels (i.e. something less than a direct
use of force against another state). 
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V. THE DEFENSE OF NECESSITY
A.  Historical Background
“Necessity” refers to exceptional and immediate circumstances where
the only way a state can safeguard its essential interests against particular
types of threats is to suspend its performance of an international obligation
of lesser weight or urgency.105  The policy rationale for “necessity” is that
is creates an avenue for states to avoid harmful results that may occur if
they strictly adhere to international law.106
The concept of “necessity” is not a new one.  The ILC’s commentaries
to its Articles on the Responsibility of States detail situations where the
ILC believes that necessity has previously been invoked.  For example, in
a dispute in 1832 between Britain and Portugal, Portugal had appropriated
property from British subjects in contravention of a treaty between the two
countries.107  Portugal tried to justify this on the grounds of a pressing need
to provide for some of its troops involved in subduing domestic
disturbances.108
Another example is an incident which took place during a civil uprising
in Canada in 1837, where Canadian insurgents were supported by
Americans from across the border.109  The Americans used their own ship,
The Caroline, to supply the Canadians with weapons.  To counter this
threat, British soldiers destroyed the vessel while it was in American
territory.110  The British government claimed self-defense.111  However, the
ILC believes that this was more a case of a plea of “necessity” than self-
defense.112  It should be noted that the customary international law
requirements for self-defense were necessity and proportionality.113
Accordingly, a successful claim of self-defense was contingent on a
showing of necessity and proportionality.  Proportionality, as it applies as
part of self-defense, requires that the response to the armed attack be
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proportional in terms of the extent of the force used, its goals, and the
manner in which the responsive force is used. 114
Necessity can also be applied in the context of the environment and, in
particular, conservation.  Unilateral conservation measures have previously
been justified under the doctrine of necessity.115   In its Articles on State
Responsibility, the ILC has also acknowledged that necessity can be
invoked with respect to conservation.116  For example, in 1893 the Russian
Government instituted a ban on seal hunting in certain areas outside of
Russian sovereign waters.  This ban was justified because of the need to
prevent decimation of the seal population by foreign hunters.  The Russians
used the absolute necessity of acting before the start of the hunting season,
which was imminent at the time, as the basis for instituting the ban.117
The Torrey Canyon disaster also involved the use of the doctrine of
necessity as a justification for taking conservation measures.  The case
involved a foreign oil tanker off the British coast, which was leaking oil
and polluting the environment.  After several attempts were made to deal
with the problem the British government bombed the tanker to destroy the
oil.  The British government claimed the doctrine of necessity applied
because: (1) the leaking oil posed an immediate risk; and (2) the bombing
only occurred after other methods to clean up the oil had failed.118
In the Gabèíkovo-Nagymaros case the International Court of Justice
(ICJ) recognized that the necessity doctrine could be applied in a
conservation context.119  However, the ICJ declined to apply necessity in
that particular factual situation.120  Accordingly, it would appear that the
doctrine of necessity could potentially apply to a conservation situation
involving CCAMLR members taking action against IUU fishing vessels on
the high seas to prevent CCAMLR conservation measures from becoming
ineffective.
B.  Necessity as a Separate Defense
“Necessity” is one of the essential elements of a claim of self-defense.
Accordingly, there is an issue as to whether “necessity” can exist as a
separate defense to self-defense.  If necessity only applies in the context of
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self-defense it may not be able to be used in the CCAMLR context.
Bodansky and Crook point out that prior to the ILC’s Draft Articles, the
defense of necessity was not universally accepted by the international
community and was sometimes only accepted in the context of self-defense
and the use of force.121  Bodansky and Crook do not seem convinced by the
ILC’s acceptance of necessity as a defense in international law stating that
the “arbitral awards and bits of state practice stitched together in the
commentary to support the principle of necessity may strike some readers
as dated, ambiguous, or otherwise not particularly compelling.”122
In the Gabèíkovo-Nagymaros case the defense of necessity, was
accepted as a separate defense. This suggests that necessity may have
international standing, independent of self-defense, in international law.
However, the ICJ relied on the ILC Draft Articles to justify the existence
of necessity as a separate defense in international law.123  Therefore,
Bodansky and Crook argue that because the Court relied on the ILC Draft
Articles, it would be a case of circular reasoning to rely on the Gabèíkovo-
Nagymaros case as a justification for the existence of a defense of necessity
separate from the defense as set out in those articles.124  These
commentators also point out that the ILC itself acknowledges, in its
commentaries to the Draft Articles that, in the Rainbow Warrior arbitration,
the Arbitral Tribunal did not accept the necessity doctrine.125
Whether the criticism of Bodansky and Crook is justified or not, the
doctrine of necessity has clearly been accepted as a separate defense in
international law.  Regardless of whether the ICJ’s justification of necessity
in the Gabèíkovo-Nagymaros case is somewhat circular, the fact remains
that the Court did accept it as a separate and valid defense.  There has also
been acceptance of the doctrine of necessity as a separate defense in other
contexts and forums by states themselves,126 supporting the view that,
whatever the position in the past, necessity is now firmly entrenched as a
separate defense in international law.
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C.  Elements of Necessity
The ILC, in its Draft Articles, has codified the international law
relating to necessity.  Draft Article 25 outlines the defense of necessity as
follows:
1. Necessity may not be invoked by a State as a ground for
precluding the wrongfulness of an act not in conformity with
an international obligation of that State unless the act: 
(a) Is the only way for the State to safeguard an essential
interest against a grave and imminent peril; and 
(b) Does not seriously impair an essential interest of the State
or States towards which the obligation exists, or of the
international community as a whole. 
2. In any case, necessity may not be invoked by a State as a
ground for precluding wrongfulness if: 
(a) The international obligation in question excludes the
possibility of invoking necessity; or 
(b) The State has contributed to the situation of necessity.127
It should be noted, however, that the status of the concept of necessity as
set out in the ILC’s Draft Articles is far from clear.  The U.N. General
Assembly adopted a resolution with respect to the Draft Articles which
“commends them to the attention of Governments without prejudice to the
question of their future adoption or other appropriate action.”128  The
General Assembly then, in the fifty-ninth session, merely held discussion
of the articles over until the sixty-second session.129  Accordingly, the ILC’s
Draft Articles have not yet been accepted by the community of nations and
so do not necessarily constitute an acceptable source of international law.
Their status, therefore, remains questionable in respect of whether they
represent a correct statement of the international law relating to necessity.
Johnstone contends that the ILC’s Articles on State Responsibility could
come within the “subsidiary means for the determination of rules of law”
as outlined in Article 38(1)(d) of the Statute of the International Court of
Justice.130  The ICJ’s acceptance of  the concept of necessity in the
Gabèíkovo-Nagymaros case as set out in an earlier draft of the ILC’s Draft
Articles, suggests that necessity, as outlined by the ILC, is a true
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representation of the concept in international law. 131  Each of the elements
that must be satisfied in order to make out a defense of necessity will now
be examined.
1. An “Essential Interest”
The first requirement of the defense of necessity is that the act in
question is necessary to safeguard an “essential interest” of a state.  The
ILC commentaries state that “[t]he extent to which an interest is essential
depends on all the circumstances and cannot be prejudged.” 132  The ILC
asserts that the interests that can be established as “essential” can include
the particular interests of the state as well as the international community
as a whole.133
2. “Grave and Imminent Peril”
In addition, a claim of necessity requires that the action taken by a state
be against a “grave and imminent peril.”  The ILC Commentaries to Article
25 confirm that  “peril” must be objectively established and it cannot be
something that is a mere possibility.134  There must also be sufficient
temporal proximity between the action taken and the “peril.”135
The Court in Gabèíkovo-Nagymaros held that “peril” suggests the idea
of “risk,” although in that case a “peril” was not established due to the
uncertainties of the risk.136  The Court also confirmed that “imminence” is
synonymous with “immediacy” or “proximity” and does not include a mere
“possibility.”137  Therefore, uncertainty can prevent the “peril” from being
sufficiently imminent.138  In this respect, the Court stated that peril
appearing in the long-term can be “imminent” if that peril is not any less
certain and inevitable, even though it is long-term.139
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3. The “Only Way”
The action for which necessity is relied on must be the “only way” by
which the state can safeguard the essential interest.  Therefore, necessity
cannot be relied upon where there are other lawful means that can be used,
even where more costly or less convenient. 140
4. Impairment of Interests of Other States or the International Community
The conduct of the state must also not impair the essential interests of
the other state involved or the international community as a whole.  As a
result, action taken to protect the essential interest of that state must
outweigh all other considerations on a reasonable assessment of the
competing interests, including collective interests.141
D.  Can Necessity be Invoked by CCAMLR Parties?
There is an issue as to whether necessity can be pleaded by CCAMLR
parties if those states took action against IUU fishing vessels of non-parties
in high seas areas of the CCAMLR zone.  In particular, a plea of necessity
will only be valid if the criteria outlined above have been met.  The
application of these criteria to the IUU fishing problem in Antarctica will
now be examined.  
1. An “Essential Interest”
For CCAMLR parties to invoke necessity in defense of action taken
against IUU fishers, there must be a need to safeguard an “essential
interest.”  Commentaries to an earlier draft provision of the Articles on
State Responsibility, Article 33, suggest that the ILC has previously
acknowledged that an “essential interest” might include the ecological
preservation of all or some of a state’s territory.142  The Court, in the
Gabèíkovo-Nagymaros case, recognized that the natural environment could
relate to an “essential interest.”  Referencing its comments in the Legality
of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons Advisory Opinion the Court
recalled the “great significance that it attaches to respect for the environ-
ment, not only for states but also for the whole of mankind.” 143
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Accordingly, conservation of the environment in the Antarctic region
may constitute an “essential interest” of a state.  The issue, however, would
be whether fishing on high seas areas could be an “essential interest” of a
state if it did not relate directly to that state.
The first point to make is that some states, such as France and
Australia, do have legitimate sovereign areas and resultant EEZs in the
Antarctic region.  Thus, as already discussed, IUU fishing on the high seas
can still impact states’ sovereign rights of exploitation within the EEZ
because that fishing can affect dependent species in the EEZ or affect
species that straddle or migrate between high seas areas and those EEZs.
In this respect, IUU fishing on the high seas would relate directly to a
state’s interests in the EEZ.
The ILC itself, in the Commentaries to Article 33, contemplated that
necessity can be invoked even with respect to action that a state takes on
the high seas where such conduct is a threat to a vital ecological interest.144
The particular interests involved are not just limited to those of a state, but
can be those of the international community as a whole.  As was outlined
at the beginning of this paper, the FAO has characterized IUU fishing as
one of the major threats to world fish stocks.  Accordingly, action taken
against IUU fishers is safeguarding an “essential interest” of the
international community as a whole because such fishing threatens the
interest that the international community has in preserving the Antarctic
ecosystem.  That is, IUU fishing is an attack on the “essential interest” that
the international community has in preserving the Antarctic marine
environment, both to allow the equitable sustainable exploitation of living
resources by all states and simply to ensure the continued viability of the
Antarctic ecosystem for future generations. 
It is useful to examine some specific cases.  For example, the M/V
“Saiga” Case involved the arrest by Guinea of a flagged vessel of Saint
Vincent and the Grenadines that was “bunkering” in Guinean waters.145
The Guinean Government alleged that the vessel had breached Guinea’s
customs laws by importing fuel without declaring it and paying tax on it.146
One of Guinea’s arguments on the merits of the case was that the measures
taken by Guinea were justified by a “state of necessity.”147  The Tribunal
held that no evidence was given by Guinea to show that its essential
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interests were in grave and imminent peril.148  However, the Tribunal
seemed to concur that Guinea’s interest in maximizing tax revenue from the
sale of fuel to fishing vessels was an “essential interest.”149  It would
therefore seem that something like Antarctic fishing, which may not be a
vital interest of a state in that the state’s economy is dependent on that
thing, can still be an “essential interest.”    
Another example relating directly to fisheries is a dispute that occurred
between the United States and Canada over pacific salmon.  Canadian
fishermen believed that Alaskan fishermen were taking an inequitable part
of Canada’s share of the salmon catch.150  In response, Canada imposed a
transit fee on American vessels in Canadian waters.151  Kreiver argues that,
with respect to this dispute, the critical state of certain salmon stocks at the
time could be characterized as an “essential interest” of the state that was
in grave and imminent peril.152  Arguably, fisheries on the high seas in
Antarctica are a similar “essential interest.”
The doctrine of necessity was also raised in a fisheries context during
the “turbot war,” a Canadian-European Union fishing dispute over fishing
rights off Canada’s coast.  Specifically, Canada argued that the doctrine of
necessity justified its arrest of a Spanish vessel, the Estai, outside of
Canada’s EEZ.153
The applicability of the doctrine of necessity with respect to using force
to seize a foreign fishing vessel was not resolved in the Estai case because
Canada had not exhausted all the options available to it before taking
unilateral action.154  Arguably the doctrine of necessity did not apply
because Canada could have taken other actions to protect its “essential
interest.”155  The ICJ did not, however, rule on the legality of the doctrine
of necessity defense with respect to this dispute.156  The argument raised in
the case once again suggests that fisheries on the high seas can be an
“essential interest” of a state.
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One final example is the Fisheries Jurisdiction Case,157 which involved
a case brought before the ICJ by the United Kingdom.  Iceland had
instituted national legislation claiming a fisheries zone beyond its territorial
sea in which it was preventing British fishers from taking fish stocks.158  In
the provisional measures hearing in the case, the Court instituted
provisional measures based on the “exceptional dependence of the
Icelandic nation upon coastal fisheries” and “of the need for the
conservation of fish stocks in the Iceland area.”159  However, on the merits
Judge Ignacio-Pinto made a separate declaration in which he stated that
Iceland’s special situation could not exempt it from international
commitments into which it has entered.160  Thus, Judge Ignacio-Pinto’s
declaration and the holding of the Court in the provisional measures
hearing would appear to highlight two contrasting views concerning
whether fisheries can constitute an “essential interest” of a state.161
2. “Grave and Imminent Peril”
For necessity to apply, action taken by CCAMLR parties against IUU
fishers must also be characterized as a response to a “grave and imminent
peril.”  As previously discussed, “peril” suggests the idea of risk.  In the
case of IUU fishing, the “peril” is the risk that IUU fishing will have a
detrimental effect on the Antarctic ecosystem,  particularly because IUU
fishing threatens the effectiveness of CCAMLR conservation measures in
the CCAMLR zone.  The risk to the future viability of individual species
in Antarctica and the Antarctic ecosystem as a whole  is sufficiently grave
because it affects the future of sustainable exploitation of such species by
the international community.
The question remains as to whether the peril, or risk, caused by IUU
fishing is sufficiently “imminent” in the Antarctic region.  The peril must
be more than a mere possibility and must be proximate to the risk, although
a long-term peril can still be “imminent.”  The threat of IUU fishing  and
the risk from IUU fishing is more than a mere possibility.  Accordingly,
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even if IUU fishing only had a major impact on particular species and the
Antarctic ecosystem in the long-term, this could still potentially be an
“imminent peril.”  Furthermore, IUU fishing is a major threat to the world’s
fish stocks in general due, in particular, to the large size of this catch
compared to legal fisheries.
However, detractors from this view may argue that there is too much
uncertainty with respect to the effect of IUU fishing in Antarctica on
particular species.  The ILC Commentaries to Article 25 acknowledge that,
when peril is defined in terms of a threat to natural resource conservation
and the environment, there will often be issues of scientific uncertainty. 162
In the Gabèíkovo-Nagymaros case the ICJ found that necessity could still
be relied upon where there was uncertainty where the available evidence
clearly established the peril,163 although it was held that there was too much
uncertainty in that case to establish an “imminent” peril.
To determine whether a peril is sufficiently “imminent” one would
expect to analyze the strength of the scientific evidence and the degree of
uncertainty in that evidence.  However, some contend that the ICJ in the
Gabèíkovo-Nagymaros case failed to appropriately consider scientific
evidence and environmental risks in respect of ecological necessity.164  In
this author’s opinion, it is difficult to see how the existence of a “grave and
imminent peril” can be objectively evaluated without an examination of the
scientific evidence concerning the particular risk to the environment
involved.
It is beyond the scope of this article to conduct an analysis of the
scientific evidence concerning the risks of IUU fishing in high seas areas
on the Antarctic environment and the uncertainty in that regard.  However,
one should note that there is evidence that fishing can have a detrimental
impact on Antarctic species, especially where fishing activities are
conducted in particularly sensitive localities.  For example, there is
evidence that fishing of Antarctic krill in certain specific localities can have
a detrimental impact on land-based predator colonies during their breeding
season.165
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3. A Precautionary Approach
A further counter-argument to the fulfillment of the “grave and
imminent peril” criterion with respect to IUU fishing in the CCAMLR zone
is that many of CCAMLR’s conservation measures are “precautionary” in
nature.  That is, CCAMLR adopts conservation measures even where
scientific uncertainty exists regarding a particular species and the impact
of fisheries on that stock and dependent species.  In the Gabèíkovo-
Nagymaros  case Hungary argued that the precautionary principle should
apply when determining whether a plea of necessity would be successful;
specifically whether there was a “grave and imminent peril.”166  Some argue
that the ICJ’s decision in the Gabèíkovo-Nagymaros case demonstrates that
the criteria required to satisfy necessity, as outlined by the Court, will mean
that, in some circumstances, the precautionary principle will not apply,
particularly where there is scientific uncertainty regarding the potential
environmental harm of an activity.167  As a result, there is a lack of clarity
as to whether necessity could be invoked with respect to CCAMLR’s
conservation measures because that organization adopts a precautionary
approach.
However, if CCAMLR adopts a precautionary approach to its regional
management measures a defense of necessity should not be precluded.  The
use of the precautionary approach does not mean that sufficient certainty
does not exist with respect to the risk of IUU fishing to the Antarctic
ecosystem.  Dobos contends that the ICJ in the Gabèíkovo-Nagymaros case
failed to appropriately consider scientific evidence and environmental risks
with respect to ecological necessity. 168  Dobos argues that, if scientific
evidence is a crucial part of evaluating the “imminence” requirement of
necessity, then the precautionary principle consequently should be used to
evaluate such evidence.169  Although the precautionary approach was not
explicitly recognized in the Gabèíkovo-Nagymaros case, there may be a
place for that principle in the necessity plea.  There has been a much wider
recognition of the principle by the international community since that case,
which suggests that the application of the defense of necessity should be
adapted to take into account such greater acceptance.170
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4. Sustainable Development
A related principle to the precautionary approach is that of “sustainable
development.”  “Sustainable development,” in a broad sense, refers to
balancing humanity’s right to development with its right to environmental
protection.171 Thus, “sustainable development” essentially involves
balancing economic factors against the need to conserve the environment
so that economic benefits from the environment can be realized in the
future.  This principle is also embodied in CCAMLR in terms of its
“rational use” objectives.172
One could argue that the burden IUU fishing imposes on the
sustainable use objectives and conservation measures of CCAMLR should
bolster the case for necessity and justify action against IUU fishers by
CCAMLR parties.  However, the Court in Gabèíkovo-Nagymaros referred
to sustainable development as a concept, which may imply that the ICJ did
not accept it as a legal principle of customary international law.173
Accordingly, the principle would not appear to be something that can be
taken into account when applying necessity, despite Vice President
Weeramantry’s separate opinion in that case, which seems to indicate a
contrary view.174
5. The “Only Way”
As previously discussed, the action taken by a state must be the only
way for it to safeguard the essential interest.  Therefore, there is a question
whether action taken against IUU fishers on the high seas is the only way
to prevent detrimental harm to the Antarctic ecosystem and to the
effectiveness of CCAMLR conservation measures.  As already outlined, if
alternative lawful means are available, even if they are more costly or less
convenient, then necessity cannot be pleaded.
In the current situation, it is submitted that all lawful alternative means
have already been taken and are failing to resolve the IUU problem.  The
ILC Commentaries to Draft Article 25 outline that the other lawful means
for taking action contemplated by the necessity defense are not limited to
unilateral action.  Other means can include cooperative action among states
or through international organizations, such as conservation measures taken
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for fisheries through a regional fisheries organization.175  In the current
situation, cooperative measures have already been attempted through the
relevant regional fisheries organization, which is CCAMLR.  CCAMLR
has already introduced a system of Port State controls in the form of its
Catch Documentation Scheme as a control mechanism on IUU fishing.176
That is, it has already tried a trade-based mechanism to stem the flow of
IUU fishing.  CCAMLR has also attempted to encourage non-parties to
become members of CCAMLR, or at least to abide by the Commission’s
conservation measures.  Therefore, it has already made attempts to seek a
multilateral solution to the IUU fishing problem in the CCAMLR zone.
A counter-argument may be made that, for fisheries where CCAMLR
sets precautionary catch limits, other states should not have to abide by
CCAMLR conservation measures where they are not getting a share of
those catch limits under CCAMLR.  However, there are already a plethora
of international agreements (both binding and non-binding) such as the
IPOA, the FAO Code of Conduct, and the Compliance Agreement that
require governments to control their flag vessels.  As outlined previously,
such agreements were poorly implemented and resulted in inadequate flag
state control and increased incidences of IUU fishing.  The ineffectiveness
of international agreements in dealing with the problem of vessel reflagging
to “flags of convenience” was also outlined above.  Furthermore, those
third-party states could join CCAMLR and be allocated their share of any
precautionary catch quotas in the CCAMLR zone.  This argument may be
bolstered if IUU fishing and lack of flag state control over those IUU
vessels breached the UNCLOS conservation restrictions placed on the
freedom of fishing on the high seas.  As mentioned, this issue will not be
analyzed in detail in this paper.  Accordingly, in light of the plethora of
measures that have already been taken (including attempts at multilateral
solutions), it is submitted that the only way that this problem can be
stemmed is if CCAMLR members take action against IUU fishing vessels
on the high seas in the CCAMLR zone.
6. Impairment of Interests of Other States or the International Community
The final requirement for necessity to apply is that action taken by a
state must not impair the essential interests of other states or the
international community as a whole.  Because IUU fishing threatens the
interests that the international community has in the Antarctic region’s
266 OCEAN AND COASTAL LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 13:2
living resources, action taken by CCAMLR members against IUU fishing
vessels in the high seas CCAMLR zone would actually benefit the interests
of the international community, rather than impair it.  Such action would
ostensibly harm the interests of flag states whose IUU flag vessels were
targeted, but the impairment of these interests should be outweighed by the
need to prevent detrimental impacts to the ecosystem, and, in effect, protect
the greater interests of the international community as a whole.
E.  Limitations on Necessity—Application to IUU Fishing
There are several limitations on the use of necessity outlined in the
ILC’s Articles which prevent the necessity defense from being invoked.
The first of these limitations is where the international obligation that has
been breached excludes the possibility of invoking necessity.  There is
nothing in UNCLOS which specifically precludes the defense of necessity
where the provisions of that treaty have been breached and, in this author’s
opinion, there is also nothing which impliedly precludes the defense.
Accordingly, there is nothing in UNCLOS that excludes the defense from
being utilized where the high seas fishing freedom rights under UNCLOS
have not been respected.  With respect to the prohibition on the use of
force, there is no explicit exclusion of necessity as a valid defense
(although, as discussed, there remains an unresolved issue as to whether
there is an implied exclusion of necessity).
The second limitation is where the state pleading the defense has
contributed to the situation of necessity.  The current problem is that IUU
fishing and non-observation of conservation measures in the CCAMLR
zone leading to over-harvesting and degradation of the Antarctic ecosystem.
One could argue that CCAMLR member states have contributed to the
problem because CCAMLR permits sustainable exploitation of stocks.
Because CCAMLR members are able to exploit stocks, a non-party to
CCAMLR may argue that these members have therefore contributed to
overexploitation.  However, this is not a valid argument.  CCAMLR is a
regional management organization that has specific systems in place to
monitor stock levels and the effects of harvesting on other species in the
ecosystem.  It also has specific monitoring mechanisms and systems in
place to ensure that stocks are being harvested sustainably and the viability
of species is not threatened.  Accordingly, if CCAMLR members act in
accordance with CCAMLR’s conservation measures, they cannot be said
to have contributed to the state of necessity.  This is in stark contrast to the
IUU fishing vessels which harvest stocks without regard to whether a
species is being sustainably harvested or whether their activities are having
a detrimental impact on dependent species in the ecosystem.
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1. Peremptory Norms
There is a final limitation on the use of a plea of necessity in respect to
peremptory norms or jus cogens.  Article 53 of the Vienna Convention
provides that “a peremptory norm of general international law is a norm
accepted and recognized by the international community of states as a
whole as a norm from which no derogation is permitted and which can be
modified only by a subsequent norm of general international law having the
same character.” 177
A basic tenet of international law, as discussed above, is that states
cannot derogate from their obligations under a peremptory norm in any
circumstances.  This principle is reflected in the ILC’s Draft Article 26,
which provides that, “nothing . . .  precludes the wrongfulness of any act of
a state which is not in conformity with an obligation arising under a
peremptory norm of general international law.”178  Accordingly, the defense
of necessity does not preclude the wrongfulness of a state’s act where that
act is in breach of a peremptory norm of general international law.  The
peremptory norm of the prohibition on the use of force has already been
discussed above with respect to forcible actions.  However, the question
remains whether the high seas fishing freedom is a peremptory norm.
2. High Seas Freedom of Fishing as a Peremptory Norm
The freedom of the seas has been recognized as part of customary inter-
national law for centuries.  The question is whether it has the customary
law status of a peremptory norm from which no derogation is permitted.
Hugo Grotius, often described as the “father of international law,” argued
in his seventeenth-century work, Mare Liberum, that the freedom of the
seas was a universal law from which derogation was not permitted.179
Accordingly, one could argue that the freedom of the seas has been a
peremptory norm or universal law for centuries.  Modern scholars appear
to share this view that the freedom of the high seas is a peremptory norm.180
Prima facie, it would appear to be highly likely that the high seas
fishing freedom is a peremptory norm.  Thus, the issue is whether seizure
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of IUU fishing vessels on the high seas would breach this peremptory norm
and render it impossible to make out a plea of necessity.  The key to
answering this question is to be found in the codification of the high seas
fishing freedom in UNCLOS.  As previously discussed, the traditional high
seas fishing freedom has been tempered by requirements for conservation
on the high seas.  At issue is the status of these UNCLOS provisions under
customary law and whether those conservation requirements are now
themselves part of a peremptory norm of high seas fishing freedom.
3. The High Seas Fishing Freedom as Customary Law
The principles outlined in UNCLOS and, in particular, the conservation
restraints/obligations placed on the traditional fishing freedom on the high
seas may constitute customary international law.  Customary international
law requires the existence of a generally accepted and widespread state
practice and opinio juris (i.e., an intention to be legally bound by the
practice) of a majority of the international community.  Accordingly,
certain provisions of UNCLOS (or even UNCLOS as a whole) could con-
stitute customary law.  For example, Lee asserts that UNCLOS “represents
customary international law to a wide extent” because it represents
codification of pre-existing customary law and represents emergent law that
has been accepted by consensus at a conference (i.e., UNCLOS III) by the
vast majority of participants.181  This assertion, particularly Lee’s opinion
that UNCLOS as a whole could constitute customary law, is open to
criticism.  However, the validity of this idea will not be examined here.
There is, however, an issue as to the relationship between the
conservation obligations/requirements in UNCLOS and the prior high seas
fishing freedom.  Customary law can continue to exist in parallel to a
legally-binding rule in a treaty or convention and, in this respect, the two
rules do not need to cover the same content or overlap precisely.182
However, there may be an implied intention for parties to a convention to
exclude incompatible customary law rules (i.e., show a legal intention not
to be bound by those rules) of similar subject matter to a convention rule.183
The problem with this contention in the case of the high seas fishing
freedom’s relationship to UNCLOS is that the freedom, prima facie,
represents a peremptory norm.
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Many scholars that have examined jus cogens highlight that the two
main consequences are an absolute prohibition against violating the rule
and the invalidity of any legal instrument which contravenes the rule.184  As
discussed above, Article 53 of the Vienna Convention makes clear that no
derogation from peremptory norms with respect to binding treaties is
permitted.185  Czapliñksi argues that the mere conclusion of a treaty
contrary to a jus cogens permits a state to claim the treaty is invalid.186
Accordingly, if the traditional high seas freedom of fishing was absolute,
then UNCLOS’s conservation provisions that purportedly place obligations
on parties in relation to this absolute freedom would breach the peremptory
norm and be invalid.  The only two solutions to this legal dilemma, which
can result in a valid UNCLOS are: (1) that the conclusion of the UNCLOS
treaty itself modified a peremptory norm of absolute fishing freedom on the
high seas; or, (2) that the conservation obligations/restrictions already
formed part of this peremptory norm before the conclusion of UNCLOS.
4. UNCLOS High Seas Conservation as a Peremptory Norm
To determine the status of the UNCLOS conservation requirements as
part of a high seas fishing peremptory norm, it is necessary to examine the
nature of peremptory norms and how they are formed.  Czapliñksi is of the
view that formation of peremptory norms takes place exclusively by way
of customary law, although a multilateral treaty could codify an emergent
peremptory norm.187  Czapliñksi also accepts the possibility that peremptory
norms could be created by international organizations through resolutions
of their political organs.188
Consensus showing general approval of a text at a conference such as
UNCLOS III can potentially indicate opinio juris for the formation of new
customary law.189  Although universal practice among states is not
necessary to form customary law, the practice must be “common and wide-
spread among many States.”190  Traditionally, a practice would also need
to persist over quite a long period of time, although many commentators
believe that customary law can still arise over a relatively short time
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frame.191  Some commentators have also argued for the concept of “instant”
customary law in which a principle is accepted by a majority of states in a
form such as a unanimously-accepted UN General Assembly resolution.192
As discussed above, Czapliñksi argues that peremptory norms are formed
exclusively through custom; although, there is a possibility that the
resolutions of international organizations could create instant custom.
Accordingly, UNCLOS III and the subsequent adoption of UNCLOS could
potentially have created new customary law, but it is unlikely that the
conference and the subsequent adoption of the treaty modified an existing
peremptory norm.
There is, however, a possibility of a peremptory norm being altered by
a subsequent customary law rule, but it should be noted that any new state
practice that may lead to new custom could potentially violate the existing
peremptory norm.193  The Vienna Convention describes a peremptory norm
as a norm “which can be modified only by a subsequent norm of general
international law having the same character.”194  This provision acknowl-
edges that a peremptory norm can be modified by subsequent developments
in international law on the subject covered by the norm.  This means that
if the freedom of fishing on the high seas was absolute (in that no
conservation obligations were placed on states), then it could have been
modified in light of later practices in international law.
To understand whether and how a peremptory norm can be modified,
it is also necessary to analyze the theoretical nature of such norms.  Grotius,
in Mare Liberum, argued that the freedom of the seas was a construct of
natural law.195  As part of this hypothesis, he contended that things like the
sea are by their very nature open to the use of all because they were
produced by nature and have never come under the sovereignty of
anyone.196  He argued that such things belong to human society as a whole
and are the common property of all according to the law of nations.197
Grotius believed that this principle of common use applied to the
exploitation of fisheries as well as the use of the seas for navigation.198  He
argued that things like fisheries resources in the sea were forever exempt
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from private ownership “by the consensus of opinion of all mankind”
because of their susceptibility to universal use.199
If peremptory norms are based on natural law, then arguably they
cannot be modified, because how can one change a product of nature?
Grotius’ arguments seem to suggest an absolute freedom of fishing on the
high seas, which is not subject to any form of restriction.  However, placing
conservation obligations on states who fish on the high seas would not be
inconsistent with the notion of the high seas as public property or a global
commons under natural law, if that were indeed the theoretical basis of a
peremptory norm.  If the sea is a global commons, as asserted by Grotius,
then everyone should have the right to share in its resources because those
resources belong to human society as a whole.  However, if those resources
are depleted by overfishing, then other states and future generations will be
unable to share in the common ownership of those resources in the future.
Accordingly, a construct whereby resources are the public property of
humanity as a whole cannot be observed if certain parties deplete the
resources to such an extent that no one can have the benefit of those
resources.  The only rational conclusion for this line of reasoning is that
tempering an absolute high seas fishing freedom by placing conservation
obligations or requirements on states is not inconsistent with natural law.
However, Grotius’ assertions that high seas freedoms are a product of
natural law may not mean that the high seas fishing freedom, as a
peremptory norm, is based on natural law.  Orakhelashvili contends that jus
cogens resembles natural law, but that “the crucial question . . . is not
whether a norm is part of natural law, but whether it is of such character as
to prevail over positive law.”200  Another justification for the existence of
peremptory norms, or perhaps an indicator of when they exist, is based
upon morality, where rights or obligations are required to protect the
international community of states as a whole.201  Similarly, Verdross refers
to the ethics of the international community as a basis for peremptory
norms.202
Whether one looks at morality, ethics, or any other justification as to
why a peremptory norm should prevail over positive law, a conservation
obligation restricting the high seas fishing freedom can be justified under
any rationale.  If states are not obligated to conserve high seas natural
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resources, then those fisheries are likely to become depleted through IUU
fishing, potentially causing harm to other species in regional ecosystems.
Conservation is necessary to protect the global commons fisheries
resources so that all states are free to utilize them.  IUU fishing also gives
rise to issues of equity because, if a limited group of fishers take all the
resources, then an inequitable outcome arises for the majority of states that
should also have access to those fisheries.  Similarly, depleting fish stocks
now raises problems of intergenerational equity in that future generations
will be unable to benefit from the freedom of fishing on the high seas
because of depleted population levels.  Furthermore, the depletion of high
seas resources can also affect the viability of straddling or highly migratory
species in the EEZs of coastal states, therefore directly affecting the
sovereign rights of those individual states.  All of these issues justify a
conservation obligation/restriction forming part of a peremptory norm of
high seas fishing freedom.
The question is whether such a peremptory norm does, in fact, exist.
It is unlikely that the agreement of states at UNCLOS III and the
subsequent adoption of the UNCLOS treaty, as discussed above, has
independently modified an existing peremptory norm.  Orakhelashvili
argues that there must be a clear reason why a peremptory norm is non-
derrogable and this must be a reason “independent of the will of States.”203
Such reasons have been discussed above and, if there were originally a
peremptory norm constituting an absolute fishing freedom on the high seas,
the norm may have been subsequently modified.
As discussed above, some commentators argue that customary law is
likely to be the exclusive source of peremptory norms.  Accordingly,
changes in customary law must be responsible for changes in peremptory
norms.   Customary law can change where a prior custom is no longer
characterized by general, uniform, and constant state practice and opinio
juris.204  Thus, a change in the attitudes and practices of states towards
conservation of resources on the high seas may have led to a modification
of the original peremptory norm of absolute freedom.  
Although new state practices could lead to modifications of a
peremptory norm, they could also be in danger of violating the existing
peremptory norm.  However, the two principles are not mutually exclusive,
for only if conservation is observed can the community of nations take
advantage of the high seas fishing freedom.   Without conservation the
freedom is essentially meaningless because there will be no substantive
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resources for states to exploit.  Thus, a change in state practice would likely
not constitute a breach of the existing peremptory norm.
While this paper did not conduct a study of actual state practice since
the conclusion of UNCLOS, it is useful to provide several brief examples
of earlier recognized changes in state practice.  In the early twentieth
century, states changed practice by expanding their claims for exclusive
fisheries zones adjacent to their coasts, mainly because of overexploitation
and a need to conserve fish stocks.205  It was due to consistent state action
to designate an extended boundary for exclusive fishing that the
international community finally recognized the expansion of the fisheries
zone out to 200 miles.  This recognition is exemplified by the La Bretagne
arbitration, in which the tribunal acknowledged the expansion of fisheries
zones as state practice and customary international law since 1972, based
on developments that took place at UNCLOS III.206
Furthermore, at the time of the Fisheries Jurisdiction Case, the ICJ
stated that:
It is one of the advances in maritime international law, resulting
from the intensification of fishing, that the former laissez-faire
treatment of the living resources of the sea in the high seas has
been replaced by a recognition of a duty to have due regard to the
rights of other States and the needs of conservation for the benefit
of all.207
Even before the adoption of UNCLOS, the ICJ recognized that the freedom
of fishing on the high seas had been modified by nation states’ subsequent
recognition of a duty of conservation.
The second possibility is that a new peremptory norm of conservation
has arisen,  which is separate and distinct from the high seas fishing
freedom.  That is, the original high seas fishing freedom still exists, but
there is also a new peremptory norm relating to fisheries conservation.
Some commentators have already speculated that a peremptory norm
requiring the conservation of fish may exist.208  Alternatively, Birnie and
Boyle argue that environmental law does not contain any jus cogens
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rules,209 and presumably this view extends to a peremptory norm of
conservation of fisheries resources.
If the traditional fishing freedom has been tempered by a duty of
conservation, then arguably taking action against IUU fishers in high seas
areas of the CCAMLR zone would be consistent with this duty and would
not breach a peremptory norm of high seas fishing freedom.  As discussed,
there are specific conservation obligations/restrictions placed on high seas
fishing under UNCLOS which may reflect, or codify to some extent, a
customary law duty to conserve fisheries on the high seas.  However, as
mentioned earlier, this paper will not consider in detail whether IUU
fishing by flag state vessels on the high seas in the CCAMLR zone, and
breach of the conservation measures of the regional management organiza-
tion, would breach these conservation requirements.
Following from the above analysis, necessity should be available as a
plea with respect to action taken against IUU fishing on the high seas.  The
ILC, in the Commentaries to its first Draft Articles, contemplated that
necessity can be invoked for action that a state takes on the high seas,
where such conduct is a threat to a vital ecological interest.210
The ILC has also outlined the rationale for the inapplicability of
necessity as a justification for actions that violate peremptory norms.  The
ILC states that such norms “are so essential for the life of the international
community as to make it all the more inconceivable that a state should be
entitled to decide unilaterally, however acute the state of necessity . . . that
it may commit a breach of the obligations which these rules impose on
it.”211  The ILC also outlined that a further rationale for this exclusion was
that states had abusively invoked necessity in the past as a justification for
breaching such norms.212  In accordance with these policy objectives, action
taken against IUU fishing would actually benefit the international
community because it would fight against threats to the conservation of
species and allow those resources to be available to all states for future
generations.  Therefore, it is submitted that action taken against IUU fishers
would not be contrary to the policy rationale behind the “peremptory norm”
exception to the defense of necessity.  In this case, the IUU fishing
potentially violates a high seas fishing peremptory norm that has been
modified to take conservation into account.  Accordingly, action taken
against fishers should not breach these conservation considerations. 
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F.  Damages and Widespread Breach?
A CCAMLR member may take action against an IUU fishing vessel on
the high seas and, for example, seize its IUU fishing catch.  However, it is
unclear whether there would be any consequences for that member if a
defense of necessity could successfully be made out in such circumstances.
The ILC, in the Commentaries to its Draft Articles, stated that necessity
did not have the effect of completely absolving a state of the wrongfulness
of an act.213  Accordingly, the defense would not necessarily preclude
claims for compensation for the injurious consequences of a nation state’s
actions, even if those actions are justified by necessity.  The ILC stated that
the preclusion of the wrongfulness of an act does not automatically mean
that the act may not create an obligation for compensation.214  The ICJ
acknowledged, in the Gabèíkovo-Nagymaros case, that if Hungary’s plea
of necessity were successful, it would not exempt it from a duty to
compensate the affected state for its actions.215
As illustrated by the ILC’s comments, just because necessity does not
preclude the wrongfulness of an act, it does not necessarily follow that a
state will have to provide compensation for a breach.  Compensation
would, prima facie, be less likely if an argument could be mounted that
IUU fishing in the CCAMLR zone breached the UNCLOS requirements of
cooperation and conservation of fisheries on the high seas.  This is
particularly likely if an obligation to conserve fisheries did exist as a
peremptory norm in international law.
The flag state of the IUU fishing vessel would be the entity required to
seek compensation under international law through the dispute settlement
procedures of UNCLOS.216  A flag state may not necessarily be in favor of
taking this course of action.  If states were required to pay compensation for
action taken against an IUU vessel (for example, to compensate for the
value of any seized IUU catch), it would reduce the effectiveness of such
action.  This would particularly be the case if the flag state passed on the
compensation to the owners of the IUU fishing vessel.
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G.  Prompt Release and Necessity
A situation may arise where a CCAMLR member seizes an IUU fishing
vessel in its EEZ of the CCAMLR zone and detains that vessel in its own
territory.  UNCLOS gives a coastal state the power to take such measures
(including boarding and arrest of vessels) as are necessary to ensure
compliance with its laws for the exercise of its sovereign rights over living
marine resources in the EEZ.  It should be noted that this power does not
extend to areas outside the EEZ.
UNCLOS also requires an arrested vessel and its crew to be promptly
released on the posting of reasonable bond or other security.217  Thus, there
is a question as to whether the doctrine of necessity would also justify a
CCAMLR member state’s non-compliance with its obligations of prompt
release.  In particular, necessity may be pleaded on the grounds that if the
vessel were promptly released, it would pose a threat to the Antarctic
environment in the CCAMLR zone through continued IUU fishing.
However, this argument is unlikely to hold weight.  As outlined above,
necessity requires a sufficient temporal proximity between the essential
interest of the state and the risk or peril to that interest.  There is unlikely
to be sufficient “imminence” in relation to the risk to the Antarctic
ecosystem where a vessel is held by a state to contravene the principles of
prompt release.  As the vessel would not currently be engaging in IUU
fishing, it would not, ostensibly, pose a sufficient, immediate risk to the
Antarctic environment.  Furthermore, it may not be certain that a vessel
being held in contravention of the requirement for prompt release would
engage in IUU fishing were it released.  A “peril” must be sufficiently
certain in order for a state to sustain a plea of necessity.
The original set of circumstances that brought about the initial plea of
necessity (i.e. IUU fishing by vessels in the CCAMLR zone) could not
justify the subsequent holding of a vessel against a state’s prompt release
obligations.  As soon as the original state of necessity is no longer present,
a state then has the duty to comply with its treaty obligations.  This means
that the state could not continue to hold the vessel when those original
circumstances no longer existed (i.e. when the vessel was seized it would
no longer be IUU fishing).  Accordingly, it is unlikely that a plea of
necessity could be sustained in these circumstances to justify breaching a
state’s obligation for prompt release of a vessel.
An alternative to a state continuing to hold an IUU fishing vessel as a
means of preventing it from IUU fishing is for the state to comply with its
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prompt release obligations by requiring the posting of a bond, which acts
as a sufficient deterrent to that vessel returning to IUU fishing.  In the
Volga case, part of the bond amount that Australia had sought for the
release of the vessel was to guarantee that the vessel would carry an
operational Vessel Monitoring System,218 and would ensure observance of
CCAMLR conservation measures until the conclusion of domestic legal
proceedings in Australia.219  The International Law Tribunal, however, held
that a “good behavior bond” was not a bond or security within the meaning
of the Convention.220  Thus, it seems that CCAMLR members are left with
a very scant arsenal of deterrents to prevent seized IUU fishing vessels
from returning to IUU fishing in the CCAMLR zone once released,
particularly if states are prevented from requiring the posting of a
sufficiently-sized bond for the prompt release of such vessels.
VI. CONCLUSION
IUU fishing is an enormous problem that threatens fish stocks all
around the world.  It is of particular concern to the efficacy of Antarctica’s
regional management regime, CCAMLR, because the high seas constitute
much of the CCAMLR zone.  This makes it difficult for CCAMLR to
regulate marine living resources in the area because its conservation
measures do not apply to non-parties.  Accordingly, the effectiveness of
those measures is under threat, which could lead to depletion of fish stocks
in the region and consequent impacts on other dependent species in the
ecosystem.  The provisions of other international environmental instru-
ments are weak in nature and have done little to curb this problem, and
therefore are not useful alternatives.
CCAMLR members could tackle the problem head-on by taking action
against non-party IUU fishing vessels in high seas areas of the CCAMLR
zone.  Such action could, however, potentially breach international law.
This paper has examined the ability of CCAMLR members to plead a state
of necessity in order to avoid international culpability for such potentially
wrongful acts.
Where state actions against IUU vessels involve a use of force, there
is an issue as to whether CCAMLR members have infringed the prohibition
on the use of force in the UN Charter.  However, such a use of force is
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arguably of too low a level to breach the prohibition, especially because it
is unlikely to infringe the “territorial integrity or political independence of
any state.
It is suggested that a defense of necessity could be utilized by
CCAMLR members for action taken against IUU fishing vessels.  IUU
fishing could constitute a risk or “peril” to the essential interest of the
international community because it threatens the viability of species and the
entire ecosystem.  Thus, CCAMLR-member action may be the only way
that CCAMLR members can safeguard the interests of the international
community against IUU fishing since the plethora of international
instruments and other measures have failed to deal with the problem in any
meaningful way.
There is a risk, however, that the threat posed by IUU fishing may not
be “imminent,” as required by the necessity defense.  While a long-term
risk can still be sufficiently “imminent” where there is uncertainty con-
cerning the risk, this can make it more difficult to establish a defense of
necessity.  For example, the precautionary-conservation approach used by
CCAMLR leaves room for another state to argue that the risks of IUU
fishing are not “imminent” because of scientific uncertainty concerning the
effect of harvesting on particular species and the ecosystem as a whole.  It
is also questionable whether a sustained and continuous campaign of action
against IUU fishers could be justified under the necessity doctrine.
However, there are real and identifiable risks that exist with respect to IUU
fishing, particularly in sensitive geographic locations.
Necessity can only be invoked if there has been no breach of a
peremptory norm.  The high-seas fishing freedom is, ostensibly, such a
norm.  However, this norm would now appear to be tempered by a duty of
fisheries conservation, which arguably means that CCAMLR members
would not have breached a peremptory norm by taking action against IUU
fishers.  Accordingly, they should be able to rely on the defense of
necessity, particularly because the ILC has previously confirmed that
necessity can apply to actions taking place on the high seas.
If a defense of necessity can be successfully made out, it will not
necessarily fully absolve a state of the wrongfulness of its actions.  If acts
against IUU fishers by CCAMLR members were in breach of international
law, the flag state of the IUU vessel may be able to claim compensation.
For example, there may be a claim of compensation for the value of seized
IUU catch.  If this were the case, it would likely reduce the efficacy of the
action taken against the IUU fishers.  Still, flag states may be reluctant to
bring an action for compensation on behalf of IUU fishers.  Indeed, were
flag states to bring such an action, it may be limited in scope due to IUU
fishing’s breach of UNCLOS conservation duties.  Concrete action needs
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to be taken to reduce the threat of IUU fishing and, given the persistence of
this problem, direct action against IUU vessels may be the only viable
means of conserving fisheries resources in the Antarctic.
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APPENDIX: THE CCAMLR ZONE IN THE ANTARCTIC
Source: CCAMLR website, http://www.ccamlr.org
